Push and hold

Yu.Tyutyunnyk in Ukrainian rebel movement and Mykolaivschyna

The activities of the anti-Bolshevik Ukrainian rebel movement in the 1920s are still the national history obscure pages.

The Soviet historiography virtually ignored that subject, and propaganda, as it could, distorted the image of a peasant-rebel in the public mind. In the wake of those distortions the rebel movement for years received definition (including scientific) “banditry”, its social base, which was essentially peasant, was artificially limited to a handful of “kulaks”, various anti-Soviet “elements” and “renegades.”

Modern Ukrainian historical science is represented mainly by synthesis materials which sensitize researchers to the further detailed elaboration of the topic. Scientific problems associated with the study of the reasons of insurgency of the said period, its social base, real scale, it’s distinct periods, characteristics and attributes still need to be remedied. But it is clear, that a cold evaluation may be based only on the rigorous area study and after the new research base facilitation.

In the context of the of the peasant insurgency studying the considerable attention should be given to its leaders, who either died in the struggle against the superior military forces of the Whites and the Bolsheviks, or were persecuted later. The role of an individual in history is always the focus of a scientific query, especially when it concerns the period of the National Revolution in Ukraine, foreign intervention and civil war. The names of the rebel chieftains of that period are covered with legends “born” in the turbulent years. Many stereotypes have survived till now, as most of the documents for a long time remained outside the field of research.

One of the Ukrainian national liberation and rebel movement characters famous in story and song was General-Cornet Yurko Josipovych Tyutyunnyk. Aforementioned historical figure can be viewed from different angles. We shall focus only on some pages of Yu.Tyutyunnyk’s life – a man of the tragic fate, the head of the rebel movement. And we shall try to determine the direct and indirect influence of this outstanding personality on Mykolayivschyna.

On April 20, 1891, in the village of Budyshche, Pedinіvsk parish, Zvenigorod County, Kyiv province in agricultural family of Josip Kornіyovych Tyutyunnyk the fourth son was born. A day earlier, it was a religious holiday of Georgіy (Yurі) the Slayer of a Dragon, so the priest of the local Orthodox Mykhaylіvska Church named the newborn after the saint. It should be noted that Tyutyunnyk was called Georgiy only in the written pre-revolutionary Russian-language documents. At the beginning of the Ukrainian state formation he was named Grigorіy .. To avoid confusion, Tyutyunyk decided, that his name was to be written grass-roots – Yurko [1]. There was some confusion with the name – in Russian-language publications the word “Tyutyunik” with one “n” was used. In the Ukrainian-language publications we find the names of both options with a single “n” and the two “nn”. According to the modern Ukrainian spelling it is correct to use double letters “NN” – “Tyutyunnyk.”

The appearance of Yu.Tyutyunnyk in Mikolayivschyna related to his activities as a chief of staff in the Grygoryev’s brigade. At the beginning of December 1918, Grygoryev informed Chief Otaman of the Ukrainian People’s Republic S.Petliura on the recognition of the UNR Directory and that the units are subordinated to it. Soon Grygoryev’s troops were called Kherson Division and merged into the Southeast group of UNR Army troops. That group was a major part of the Southern Front, that began to emerge as the opposition forces of the Entente and the Whites, which made a lodgement on the Black Sea coast of Ukraine [2]. Around that time, Kherson Division consisted of four infantry divisions, one cavalry regiment and two batteries of field guns. [3]

In December 1919, the main area of the rebel troops’ of the Directory of the UNR activity was the elimination of administrative and military institutions of Denikin in the territory of Ukraine [4].

Grygoryev’s squad was one of the largest military forces of the UNR Directory, but it did not escape the Bolshevik agitation. In February 1919, after the capture of Kyiv by Soviet troops, the situation in Ukraine had changed. On February 18, 1919, in Kharkiv, was held a meeting of Grygoryev with V. Antonov-Ovseyenko who reported the Otaman on intention of the Soviet command to transform his troops into separate Red Army brigade. On February 19, according to the order of commander of the group of forces of Kharkiv direction Skachkov, was created the 1st Zadniprovska Infantry Division led by Pavlo Dybenko [5]. 26 Grygoryev’s insurgent groups were renamed the 1st Zadniprovska Brigade and were included in that division, and the chieftain himself became the red brigade commander.

Reshuffles occurred in the midst of the military operations. Soviet troops stormed their way forward the Black Sea coast. Grygoryev received order from commander of the Ukrainian Front Antonov-Ovseyenko to attack southward as well. But it was not easy, because the rebels held the front against several enemies at once – the Germans, that came down to side of the Triple Entente, the White Guards, UNR Directory troops, and the local German colonists as well. In February 1919, Grygoryev’s brigade captured Bila Krynica, Berezneguvate, Bezikhove, Snіgurіvka and other settlements. [6]

On February 27, 1919, to the post of political commissar of the 1st Zadneprovska Brigade was sent Communist Ratinov and 35 Communists – political officers more to help him. At that time, at Grigoriev’s disposal arrived member of Borotbists Party Yu.Tyutyunnyk, who the previous day in Kharkiv received from one of the Borotbists leaders M.Shinkar the commendatory letter to the Otaman. Thus, the leadership of both the Bolsheviks and Borotbists tried to increase their influence on Grygoryev’s brigade. [7] Yu.Tyutyunnyk managed to snatch control of virtually the entire leadership of troops and to become the chief of staff of the 1st Zadniprovska Brigade [8].

At the beginning of March 1919, Grygoryev’s brigade approached Kherson, where at that time were deployed substantial forces of the Triple Entente – 3 thousand Greek and about 2 thousand French soldiers.

Around the cities of the south of Ukraine, which were guarded by the Allied landing troops, peasant uprisings did not subside, and in the cities of the anarchist and Bolshevik underground became more active.

The order for Grygoryev’s brigade to storm Kherson was signed by Yu.Tyutyunnyk, who therethrough took the full responsibility for the consequences of the operation. Rather, Grygoryev was not not fully confident of his strength and did not want to jeopardise his career in the event of failure, because the brigade headquarters did not have time to prepare and to plan of the storming of the city.

However, the enthusiasm of guerrillas was so high, that they got along without any plans. On March 3, 1919, the Triple Entente’s positions in Kherson were intensely bombarded (the rebels involved three guns, each of which only the first day fired 800 shells) and Grygoryev’s brigade launched an offensive on the city. During the multi-day assault were killed, according to the testimony of Grygoryev himself, more than 200 Greek soldiers and officers (according to other sources, the total loss amounted to more than 600 Triple Entente soldiers) [9], and the loss of rebels was only 19 killed and 37 wounded.

When it became clear, that defeat was inevitable, the Greeks set fire to the port warehouse, where in the custody there were hundreds of hostages from among the locals (all of them died). Grygoryev, infuriated by those events, ordered to load one of the ships with the bodies of the Greek soldiers and send it to the address of the main allied command in Odesa.

After the capture of Kherson, Grygoryev was able to replenish stocks of weapons, ammunition and equipment. In particular, they had captured from the enemy 6 heavy guns, more than 100 guns, more than 700 rifles and 300 mules. [10] It was of great importance for the insurgents, as one of the most acute problems of those days was to provide the troops with necessary equipment and weapons.
On catastrophic situation with procurement testified one of Grygoryev’s subordinates Otaman P.TKACHENKO’s telegram to Chairman of People’s Commissars of the Ukrainian SSR H. Rakowski: “I am fighting for three months, no one is getting even weapons for this fight … My guerrillas are defending Pomoschnaya with bare hands, because half of the squad need rifles, moreover the people are barefoot and naked … “[11]. In such a critical situation were Grygoryev, Makhno and other rebel chieftains. In particular, the commander of the 1st Zadniprovska Division P. Dybenko intercepted trains, did unauthorized requisition, imposed indemnity. The other red commanders were in step with him.

Along with the struggle for Kherson Grygoryev’s troops led the successful attack on Mykolaiv (a plan for its release was also developing by Yu.Tyutyunnyk). At that time in Mykolaiv there were two English and one French destroyers, ten thousand German garrison (15th Landwehr Division), the soldiers of which were tired of fighting and wanted to go home. The French tried to take the Germans out in the Greek ships to the French colonies. The Germans refused and began to negotiate to abandon the city with the Soviet representatives. On March 2, 1919, in Mykolaiv the Greek troops landed in the amount of three thousand people. [12]

Chairman of the Mykolaiv Council of Workers’ Deputies Bolshevik Ya.Ryappo met Grygoryev with a request to stop the attack on the city during negotiations. Grygoryev supposedly agreed, but his troops, despite the formal prohibition, continued to move to the city. (V.Gorak writes that “Grygoryev, without major reasoning, rejected the request of Ya.Ryappo and firmly, in Otaman manner, said that tomorrow his brigade would take Mykolaiv by storm”) [13].

On March 5, 1919, the Mykolaiv newspaper “The Way of the Social-Democrat” published a telegram which was sent to the Mykolaiv city government by Grygoryev and political commissar of his brigade Ratinov: “To Mykolaiv city government. I order to prepare for my troops 2000 pairs of boots on March, 10. Keep in mind, that pulling Mykolaiv out of the hands of the enemy, we trampled over 2 thousand pairs of boots. Boots are to be prepared by the Kharkiv and Kyiv bourgeoisie living in Mykolaiv. We recommend to clean Mykolaiv by getting rid of the representatives of capital at the time of my arrival “[14].

Later on the same day, the Grygoryev’s brigade made the first attempt to break into the city, but was fired by the German heavy artillery and cannons of the French destroyer standing in the waters of the Southern Bug. After suffering significant losses, the Grygoryev’s brigade retreated. Mykolaiv Council of Workers’ Deputies sent an appeal to the people with a call for an uprising. On March 6, the chieftain’s brigade began shelling the city. At the same time Grygoryev refused to release a number of captured German soldiers, and after that the German command ordered to arrest 40 members of the Council of Workers’ Deputies. Their defense was made by the workers’ organizations of the city, threatening to use force for the release of those arrested. The Germans were forced to let the Deputies go.

On March 11, 1919, the Allied Command suddenly decided to leave the city, and the next day Grygoryev’s troops marched into the town. The Germans were forced to leave all weapons to the rebels (including 20 heavy guns), ammunition and more than 2000 horses [15]. Order number 1, which was signed by a chieftain in the captured city, wrote: “… any agitation against the Soviet power, against certain nationalities, as well as calls for a pogrom would be punished with death … Invasion in someone’s yard or home without the consent of the owner is punishable by death … “[16].

In the spring of 1919, the Grygoryev-Tyutyunnyk brigade performed a number of significant operations to liberate Odesa and Voznesensk. The capture of Kherson and Mykolaiv created favorable conditions for the further advance of the Red Army units. In particular, it was already on March 15, 1919, when Grygoryev’s troops captured Rozdіlna station and the main base of the Whites in the South of Ukraine – Roshtas, and later, on March 17, – the station Berezivka, where they gave a drubbing to the Franco-Polish interventionists and White Guards forces concentrated near it. In the battles for Beryozovka the enemy had lost about 500 people (150 of them were killed). Grygoryev’s troops captured 8 guns, 5 tanks, 1 armored train, 7 locomotives, about 100 machine guns. [17]

On March 18, 1919, the Otaman launched an attack on Odesa. His troops took a complete control of Serbka [18]. Late in March, Grygoryev sent an ultimatum to the Entente-White Guard forces concentrated in Odesa. He assured the enemy, that soon the Soviet troops would capture Odesa and the Crimea. In Odessa, despite the great panic which had arisen in the city, the
intensive work was carried out to strengthen the defense: military governor O. Grishin-Almazov was ousted, volunteer units were reorganized, reinforcements had been arriving. According to data cited by V. Gorak, the Odesa military group consisted of 20 thousand French, 15 thousand Greek, 2 thousand Polish, 4,5 thousand White Guard troops. In addition, in due course time the Triple Entente Command redeployed the 40th Romanian corps from Bucharest to Odesa [19]. It is clear, that Grygoryev had no chance to capture the city relying only on his own armed forces.

However, unexpectedly, on April 2, 1919, commander of the joined forces of the Entente and White Guard General d’Anselm ordered to evacuate the troops from Odesa. On April 6, 1919, Grygoryev’s brigade and the Red Army entered the city, and the next day the People’s Commissar for Military Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR N. Podvoyski issued a telegram to the Soviet government informing on the capture of Odesa [20]. On the same day, Yu.Tyutyunnyk was appointed the commandant of Odesa. He was put in to negotiate, take trophies, keep order. For the liberation of the main cities in the south of Ukraine – Kherson, Mykolaiv and Odesa, Yu.Tyutyunnyk was awarded the Order “Red Banner”. [21]

On April 13, 1919, the Grygoryev’s brigade was reformed into the 6th Infantry Division.

On May 7, 1919, M. Grygoryev was ordered to march to Bessarabia, but that order contradicted the Otaman’s plans to gain a foothold in the south-east of Ukraine. This was the pretext for the start of the military action against the Bolsheviks. On May 8, in Elisavetgrad, Yu.Tyutyunnyk announced Grygoryev’s Universal (Yu. Tyutyunnyk was the co-author of it): “The people of Ukraine! The people exhausted … instead of land and freedom you is forcibly imposed a commune, the Extraordinary Commission and the commissars from the Moscow band and from the land where Christ was crucified. You do work day and night, you flash the oil lamp, you wear the pants of burlap, but the ones who promise you a bright future, exploit you, you are used in fighting, with weapons in their hands they deprive you of your bread, confiscate your cattle, and assure you, that all this is for the benefit of the people. Worker Saint! A Man of God! Look at your calloused hands … We ask the adventurer Rakovsky’s Government and his henchmen to go away and not to force the entire nation. The All-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets gives us a government which we will obey and faithfully fulfill the will of it … Any killings without People’s court, looting, riots, break and enter, illegal requisition will be stopped then and there by force of arms. I appoint comrade Yuri Tyutyunnyk, comrade Masenko and comrade Gorbenko to be my deputies and I trust them a difficult task”[22].

The second appearance of Yu. Tyutyunnyk in Mykolaivschyna refers to the events of the UNR Army Winter Military Campaign (December 6, 1919 – May 6, 1920 (According to other reports May 5, 1920). In December 1919, the Red Army captured a significant part of the Right-Bank Ukraine. A Volunteer Army of General Denikin seized South Ukraine and the Polish units occupied Volyn and Western Podillya. The Army of UNR controlled a small area near Chortoroiya over the Sluch river in Volyn region, surrounded on all sides by the Bolshevik, Polish and Denikin’s troops. In such difficult circumstances it was impossible to continue fighting with the regular military forces. On December 4, 1919, at a meeting of members of the Government of the Ukrainian National Republic with the commanders of units of the Army in the Field in Chortoroiya it was decided to eliminate the front and regular military forces in order to focus on the performing of guerrilla warfare behind enemy lines. On December 6, 1919, the UNR Army units under the command of General M.Omelyanovich-Pavlenko went on the First Winter Campaign. The Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the UNR I. Mazepa took part in the campaign as well. The battle group was composed of three divisions: Zaporizhia (commander General O,Guliy-Gulenko), Kyiv (commander General Yu.Tyutyunnyk), Volyn (commander General O.Zagrodsky). A.Dolud was appointed the Chief of Staff [23].

Winter Campaign in the rear of the Bolsheviks and Denikin’s troops was unprecedented in the history of warfare by it’s nature and heroism. About 10,000 people were involved in it. However, the effective combat strength of the units numbered 2,000 infantry, 1000 cavalry and 14 cannons. 75% of the total accounted for headquarters units, untrained units, line of vehicles and medical trains [24].

The line break, according to the plan of commander M.Omelyanovych-Pavlenko, was to be the location the Galician Army in the area of Kozyatin-Vinnytsa-Khmilnyk strip, which was successfully performed on December 7, 1919 at Z-hour [25]. After breaking through the enemy’s front between Kozyatin and Kalynivka, the Ukrainian Army had rapidly marched to the southeast [26]. The UNR Army in the Field made towards Lypovets, Zhashkiv, Uman, Talne, Zvenyhorodka … At the end of 1919, the Ukrainian Army was positioned in such a way: Yu.Tyutyunnyk’s Kyiv group passing through Zhashkiv town and the villages of Rizine, Bagva, Zaliske, Kobrynove, Gulyayka, Gusakove, made towards Zvenyhorodka; Zagrodski’s Volyn group, having expelled the 42nd regiment of Denikin from Romanivka, moved to Talne; Zaporizhia group, headed by M. Omelyanovich-Pavlenko, concentrated in Umanschyna. On December, 31, the army commander was in Dobrovody, the army headquarters – in Oksanyne. The villagers had volunteered to guard the headquarters of the army. [27]

On December 26, 1919, the Ukrainian army lost the 3rd Infantry Division, which had been razed by the Kyiv “consolidated” Division of Prince Golitsyn, and it forced the commander to make a decision to scrap force of the 3rd Cavalry Regiment out of the remnants of the Iron Division. Reorganization was assigned to Colonel G. Chizhevski [28]. But negotiations that had begun in Vinnytsia between the Government of the UNR delegation and the Initial Command of the Ukrainian Galician Army since December 23, did not lead to the efforts joining together. But it resulted in undesirable solutions – the Galician Army quickly moved to the side of the Bolsheviks, and on January 1, 1920, having signed an agreement with Podilsk executive board, they turned to be the Red Army of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic.

The local population sympathized with the army of the UNR. In one of the heaviest fightings of Winter Campaign the native army had gotten help from the peasants of Maidanetske and Bіlashki during liberation of Talne from Denikin troops by the Volyn group. Simultaneously with the events in Talne, on January 1, 1920, Cossacks liberated Uman from Denikin troops. The city became a center of the struggle for the statehood of Ukraine [29]. After the liberation of Uman, an active educational, publishing and propaganda activity was launched in the city. The newspaper “Ukraine” had put out 5 issues of the newspaper a total of 20,000 copies, printed up to 200,000 appeals – “To the intelligentsia of Ukraine” [30] “To the officers, Cossacks and soldiers of the Volunteer Army” [31] and the “Villagers” [32], which were prepared and signed by Otaman Yu.Tyutyunnyk [33].

Those appeals were distributed among lieutenant colonels and experienced Cossacks as the notes for conversations with the local population [34].

The case file number 2054 (554803)

(RSA SZRU. – F.11012. – V.17. – P. 193, 195, 196, 228)

In late January, having found areas of concentration of the Northern Group, the Red Army decided to destroy it by flinging the entire 60th Division and cavalry into a battle against it. The task was not easy because the entire population was ranged with the army of the UNR. The order of Volyn military group dated January 31, 1920, reported on those events: “There are many Russian Bolshevik forces at the Fastow station, the Communists’ echelon with guns arrived to the station Olshannya”. [35] They failed to destroy the group of Yu. Tyutyunnyk [36]. The capture of Kaniv (by Volyn Division) on February 2-7, and offensive towards Pereyaslav and Kyiv had disturbed Russians. The Ukrainians, who lived in Kyiv, were waiting for the marching in of Ukrainian troops. After capture of Cherkasy, on the left bank the rumors had been spreading, that “the Ukrainian army has come down to the Dnipro.” From Poltava, Chernihiv, Kharkiv, Melitopol, Lugansk envoys came [37].

On February 11, 1920, the Northern group of troops as part of the Kyiv and Volyn divisions teamed with the UNR Army H.Q. near Medvedіvka in Chernіhіvschyna. Otaman Guliyev-Gulenko was appointed the commander of Zaporizhzhya division. On February, 17, Zolotonosha was liberated. But the army was forced to return to the right bank of the Dnipro. Having crossed the river, the army encamped in Holodny Yar [38]. The Army’s in the Field movement westward started simultaneously by different divisions. The Army had captured the cities of Gysin, Uman, Olviopil and railway junction Hrystynivka destroying the occupation authorities, operating in Mykolayivschyna and Khersonschyna [39].

On March 25, there was a fight of the Kyiv division with the Bolsheviks near Talne. The Red Army retreated to Maidanetske, but the next day, having received reinforcements, it forced the Tyutyunnyk’s troops out. Soon after, on April 7, Otaman Zabolotniy freed Ananyiv. To help him Yu.Tyutyunnyk sent 400 men with two cannons. At the same time the 3rd Cavalry Regiment of the 3rd Red Galician Brigade of 650 sabers come down to side of Tyutyunnyk’s troops. After heavy fighting Cossacks of the Kyiv division captured Vapnyarka and Tulchyn. Fight for Vapnyarka lasted for 15 hours. The Bolsheviks used all available reserves, including two armored trains [40]. In Tulchyn the headquarters of the 41st, 45th and 46th divisions of the 14th Army of the Bolsheviks were captured [41].

On April 16, 1920, in Voskresensk, having defeated a drive of the 14th Bolshevik army troops, the UNR Field Army seized 28 cannons and 32,000 cannon charges, 48 machine guns, 5,000 rifles and 2000000 rounds of ammunition, 4,000 carts with clothes, shoes and other property, and even 10000000 rubles as well [42]. On May 5, 1920, to execute the order of the Chief Otaman, the army of the UNR of Winter Campaign was relocated in the direction of Yampil for a breakthrough and the immediate consolidation with the front of the Chief Otaman of the UNR troops. The horse units were sent to meet with Colonel Udovychenko’s units. On May 6, 1920, the participants of the Winter Campaign merged with the other Ukrainian units, which in alliance with the Poles made for Kyiv [43]. As of the May 6, 1920, the field strength of the UNR army of Winter Campaign consisted of 2100 infantry and 580 cavalry. The military leadership consisted of 2 generals, 21 chiefs of units, 44 sotnyks, 121 petty officers and 20 junior officers. [44]

According to military historians, the First Winter Campaign of the UNR Army was the most heroic pages of the military art of the Ukrainian national revolution of 1917 – 1921, during which the Ukrainian army had successfully applied the guerrilla methods of struggle against numerous enemies for the first time. During the raid they covered 2,500 km, fought more than 50 successful battles.
Professor V. Shkvarets believes that “Winter Campaign of the UNR army captured the territory of 9 out of 19 districts of the modern Mykolaiv region. The UNR Army had struggled through its territory in the rear of the Reds and Denikin in about 300 kilometers from Kazanka, Novy Bug, Bashtanka, through Voznesensk, Veselynove, Vradіyivka and Kryve Ozero and then to Odeschyna and Vinnytchyna. Simultaneously, the part of that UNR Army raided from Uman to Tyshkivka (now Kirovohrad region), then to Pervomaischyna and Bratsky district, then reached Voznesensk, subsequently it retreated through the north-western districts of Mykolayivschyna, Odeschyna and Kirovogradschyna and linked-up in Vinnytchyna (Tulchyn – Kryzhopіl – Tomashpіl – Yampil) with the main forces of the Chief Otaman Petliura’s Republican Army in his campaign along with the Yu.Pilsudski’s Polish army to Kyiv”[45].

This is an important point in the context of our study on Yu.Tyutyunnyk’s being in Mykolaivschyna. He used his terrain knowledge while performing combat operations in March and April 1920, while capturing Olviopil [46] and Voznesensk, performing operations in the area of Kryve Ozero [47], crossing the rivers Southern Bug and Synyukha, which were strongly swollen [48]. On April 16, 1920, he captured Voznesensk from the sidelines of Bulharka [49] after last-ditch battles. [50]

The case file number 2054 (554803)

(RSA SZRU. – F.11012. – V.26. – P.94)

Hereafter, the military operations were performed in Odeschyna. On April 21, Gen. M. Omelyanovych-Pavlenko ordered to seize both Balta and Birzula. That task was entrusted to the Yu.Tyutyunnyk’s Kyiv division and Zabolotny’s insurgent forces. On April 23, Yu.Tyutyunnyk’s and Zabolotny’s units captured Birzula and Balta. In Balta they were joined by the technical Galician sotnia (170 men), which the Reds unsuccessfully tried to disarm. During the battle the city was on fire. The soldiers of the UNR Army under the leadership of Balta Commandant Lieutenant Colonel Dobrotvorsky had localized the fire and saved the property of the local Jewish population. Moreover, in Balta the Ukrainian servicemen held shooting of looters. [51] Otaman Zabolotny was active in the territory of Mykolayivschyna in Olviopol and Poltavka-Bashtanka regions [52].

On April 25, 1920, the Red Army held a counter-offensive against Balta. Yu.Tyutyunnyk’s Division retreated to the area of Sіnna, Kozatske i Krynychky settlements. Zabolotny’s rebels numbering up to 1,000 fighters remained to protect Balta were engaged in combat with the Red forces. The 5th Infantry, 3rd Cavalry Regiment and the rebels launched a counteroffensive and the Reds had to move toward Borschi station. The rebels and Petliurists had captured 2 cannons, 3 machine guns and plenty of ammunition. Meanwhile, the cavalry regiment of Black Zaporozhian Cossacks and the Black Sea Regiment (as part of the military formations of the M. Omelyanovych-Pavlenko’s Army of the UNR, it became known as “The Black Sea guerrilla regiment”) attacked the retreating Red units [53]. The Red troops retreated in different directions from Birzula and Slobidka stations. The UNR Army and the rebels took the initiative once again.

Fierce fighting in the area of Ananyev, Birzuly and Balta deprived the 14th Red Army, which operated at Vinnytsia direction of the opportunities to use the major highways Jmerinka-Odesa and Birzula-Znamianka [54].

On April 26, in the village of Poznanka (20 km. east of Balta) was held a meeting of commanders of UNR Army and rebel chieftains to discuss the plan of further actions. Yu.Tyutyunnyk recalled: “Odesa, Mykolayiv, Kherson dragged us to the south. But the cut out of the Black Sea frenge disclosed the broad political perspectives and gave great economic benefits to us. All data spoke for the fact, that it would not be difficult forus to capture the South. However, there was a risk, that the Russians would try to dump us in the sea, but where there was no risk?” [55]

Members of the First Winter Campaign of the UNR were awarded the Iron Cross and were called “Knights of the Iron Cross.” The award was approved by the Home Team of the UNR Army and Navy dated October 19, 1920, and signed by Petliura. Badge of the Order under №1 received General M. Omelyanovych-Pavlenko, №2 – Chief of Staff of campaign General Yu.Tyutyunnyk, №3 – the commander of the 2nd Volyn Division General O.Zahrodskiy. Total awarded was about 3 – 4 thousand of the UNR Army fighters. The awards – yellow-blue moire ribbons [56] – were manufactured in March and April, 1921, in Warsaw and Lviv.

On November 1920, with the end of regular warfare in the territory of Ukraine, the civil war was not over yet, as the insurgent peasantry continued fighting. French scholar A.Bezanson noted, that “by its scope, and danger to the Bolshevik regime a peasant war was more large scale and nationwide than the civil war” [57]. American historian A.Gratsiozi pointed to the chronological framework of the peasants’ war against the Bolsheviks. The first phase: 1918-1922, the second: 1928-1933. [58]

As you know, every social movement must have some ideological colour. In Ukraine, it had two shades and was clearly localized geographically. On the South and on the Left Bank the units, that used the anarcho-communist ideas, were performing. On the rest of the territory the rebel groups united by national slogans were fighting. This distinction was due primarily to the circumstances of the preceding development of Ukraine. Inasmuch as in the South of Ukraine was formed the industrial proletariat (although still closely linked to the village), here the ideas of communism in all its varieties was widely available and have been adopted by the rebels. They were grouped around the name of “Father” Makhno, and owing to that fact the movement was known as “Makhnovshchyna”.

The rebel movement gripped the whole of Ukraine, so it is difficult to clearly identify the areas of greatest activity. But we consider, that the South had more high level of organization and mass uprisings stood out, as the Left Bank and Right Bank Ukraine were deprived of universally recognized leader of the insurgent peasants (though almost all of them verbally acknowledged the supremacy of Petliura). In the South and South-Eastern Ukraine, a paradoxical situation where the ideas of communism-anarchism have been adopted by farmers who opposed the government, which was also carrying communist slogans. The most colorful figure here was “Father” Makhno. And since the bulk of insurgents formed groups around him, the peasant movement in the region was known as “anarcho-Makhnovshchyna”. [59]

Equally complex is the question of directions and typology of rebel troops of the first half of the 1920s.

In his report dated 9 February, 1921, S.Kamyenyev reported L.Trotsky, that there was “banditry” of three types:

-“The organized rebellion where the insurgents are actively supported by the local population and can win over a thousand men, if the situation permits.
– A large number of small and large gangs across the country, which are connected with the local people, but can not use their active support.
– Criminal gang violence in the full sense of the word, suppression of which is strongly supported by the peasants themselves. [60]

The first type includes Makhnovshchyna (South Ukraine and a part of the Left Bank), Petliurism (Right Bank and partly Left Bank Ukraine) as well as “green” guerrilla movement (east coast of the Black Sea and the Crimea, which in spring of 1921 were still partly controlled by insurgent peasants) [61]. It is no accident, that the reports of those years are full with statements: “… the peasants are armed without exception. A large percentage of peasants are pro-Petlyura or anarchic “[62].

In 1921, one of the most powerful Bolshevik power crisis had happened, which forced them to abandon forever the extremes of War-Communism model of socialism and to go on temporary liberalization of socio-economic and national public policy. One of the most important parts of this crisis was the rebel movement in Ukraine, a new wave of which began in spring 1921. Commander of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and Crimea M. Frunze admitted: “Banditry in Ukraine is a state disaster, the daily trashing of Soviet institutions, railway stations, telegraph offices, the robbing of warehouses and factories and dozens of senseless victims so far is a major obstacle to the restoration of normalcy in the country.” Up to April 1, 1921, the Intelligence Staff of Ukraine and Crimea registered 102 units from 20 to 400-500 people each, in some up to 800, the army of N. Makhno acted separately. In many parts of the Ukrainian SSR the revolutionary committees and councils existed only nominally, and were under the influence of a chieftain or the entire underground organizations. For three years, from 1921 to 1923, the Communists lived in villages under siege [63].

Ukraine was a predominantly agrarian country, and the Ukrainians was a peasant nation. At the same time the weakest link of “War Communism” was the agricultural sector, where there were the remains of individual ownership, and the peasants strongly resisted Communist exploitation in the form of surplus appropriation system. Therefore, since 1919, the Ukrainian peasant insurgency had become the vanguard of the struggle against communist totalitarianism variety.

The key concepts of many of historiographic concepts of the rebel movement in Ukraine is “Petliurism” and “Otamanschyna.” In Soviet historiography the term “Petliurism” was understood as a form of “Ukrainian Bonapartism”, the symbol of betrayal of the socialist ideal for national, traitorous alliance with the Poles and others. In the foreign Ukrainian historiography “Petliurism”, by contrast, was understood as a symbol of unbending, the most consistent national liberation struggle. However, in our opinion, this term as well as the corresponding phenomenon is much broader, especially given the fact that the concept of “Petliurism” as well as “Mazepinizm” became part of the national myth, and thus began to break away from the concrete historical bases.

The concept of “Otamanschyna” is equally complex. First of all, it should be noted some uncertainty, vagueness, because from the very beginning it had several layers of content, and Otamanschyna itself was not a static phenomenon, it had changed, took on new features. V.Vynnychenko used the term “Otamanschyna” in several senses:

  • Petliura’s dictatorship (here “Otamanschyna” is a synonym for “Petliurism”);
  • rivalries, power struggles;
  • otamans’ tyranny;
  • military men who became an independent political force and put national and state issues above social.

Generally, in the conventional sense, Otamanschyna emphasized the personal moment. However, in our opinion, Otamanschyna reflected not so much the fight of personalities as complexity, contradictions of situation and personal finding of its resolution. In this context, there was a conflict between Yu.Tyutyunnyk and Petliura.

The central figures of this confrontation – Petliura, Yu.Tyutyunnyk and Y.Konovalets – embodied different conceptions of the further liberation struggle. Petliura held on an alliance with the Poles. Yu.Tyutyunnyk did not trust the Poles and sought to rely on their own strength, ie UNR Army in Poland, and population of Naddnipryanschyna. Y.Konovalets fought both against the Poles and against the Bolsheviks.

The social base of Otamanschyna was rural intelligentsia: teachers, priests, starshynas. It was the layer of Otamanschyna, which in 1921-1923 became the leaders of liberation struggle. It was the most folksy, it had gained experience in the struggle, lost many illusions, was hardened. Its activities affected the psychology of the masses, actualized the element of “recalcitrance” in it. In our opinion, it was Otamanschyna, that in 1922-1923 had “dissolved” in the masses, become a factor of the further development of national identity, the main element of formation of the modern nation.

Fight experience had forced Otamanschyna to undergo changes, to become united, to strive for centralization, as evidenced the successful centralization actions of the PP headquarters. Otamanschyna had become a kind of “order” of fighters, which, according to T. Bulba-Borovets, directly and indirectly affected the formation of SVR – OUN – UPA ideology and revolutionary nationalism. [64] Gradually the chieftains got rid of the “boundless credulity”, “compliance” and “lack of awareness of the need for constant strong solidarity of all members of the State”, which Trotsky advised the Bolshevik agitators to use [65]. The priorities of the new ideology of Otamanschyna was the national state idea, fierce opposition to communism.

In our opinion, the rebel movement and Otamanschyna as historical phenomena can serve as an illustration of the main provisions of Grushevkiy’s historiosophy: the priority of the masses, “national self-defense” and the growth of politically-state system on the national basis [66]. At the last stage of the liberation struggle the impact of state building was definitely “bottom-up”. The obvious examples are Vysunska People’s Republic, Bashtanka Republic and Kholodnoyarska rebel republic.

In January 1921, were established the Guerrilla-Rebel Headquarters attached to the Main Team of the UNR Army, which task was to prepare a general uprising against Moscow-Bolshevik regime in Ukraine. Petliura entrusted General Cornet Yu.Tyutyunnyk with the task to prepare for a campaign in Ukraine. Preparations for the raid to Ukraine were carried out in coordination with the Second Division of the General Staff of the Polish Army. In particular, the Poles:

a) agreed on the organization of the General Staff of the rebellions in Lviv;
b) pledged to provide the necessary means for its headquarters and villages through which the messengers would pass to Ukraine;
c) allowed to use the interned officers and Cossacks as messengers in Ukraine;
d) promised to deliver free pass documents for Headquarters’ employees to travel by rail.

Simultaneously the Poles released 2000 interned officers and Cossacks, who voluntarily agreed to return to Ukraine to continue the fight against the Bolsheviks [67].

The Lieutenant Colonel Paliy’s Podilska group was the first to march forth. On October 25, it crossed the Soviet border in the area of Husiatyn and with continuous fights made the 1500-kilometer raid through the enemy-occupied territory of Proskurivskiy, Letichevskiy, Lubarskiy counties, returning northwards to Zhytomyr and Korosten counties, and then – to the southeast, to the cities of Malyn and Borodyanka. But it failed to join the Volyn group for joint operations, although they converge from the opposite sides in a battle with the Bolsheviks near Leonivka settlement without knowing it themselves. That unfortunate fact had fatal consequences, especially for Volyn group. On November 17, Podilska group came up to the villages of Huta Katyuzhanska and Vahivka outside of Kyiv, but was forced to return westwards, and on December, 6 to cross the Polish border, having worked about 700 km way up. The Command assessed the raid as an outstanding military feat.

The Bessarabian group was trusted to divert the enemy’s attention from the main grouping of Yu.Tyutyunnyk. But, having come on November 19, 1921 from the vicinity of Bender to the Soviet territory, it faced the superior forces of the enemy and after several days of exhausting fighting, it suffered considerable losses and was forced to retreat to the territory of Romania.

The rebel forces of General V. Nelgovski, who went to Ukraine as early as the night between 19th and 20th of September, 1921, were ordered to liaise between the Volyn group of Tyutyunnyk and Volyn rebel troops. Acting in difficult conditions of hostile pursuit, which were orchestrated by the penetration agent, the unit had lost communication with the staff and could not perform the task, but with the fighting and heavy losses it retreated abroad. The detachment of Hopanchuk, that had to liaise with single insurgent groups and to raise the local population to fight, operated independently as well. The detachment had made its way to Shepetivka, passed the towns of Slavuta, Polonne and Brusyliv and on the 24th November it came to the village of Gurіvschyna down Zhytomyr road in 25 km from Kyiv, intending to join the main forces [68].

On November 7, 1921, the Central Volyn group under the command of Yu.Tyutyunnyk, having crossed the border on the night of the 4th of November, won Korosten. But it failed to hold the city. Under the pressure of superior enemy forces the group retreated to the north of Korosten to Didkovychi with a further maneuver to the south to the area of Radomyshl and then to the northeast – to Kyiv. A much stronger enemy was waiting for them everywhere – on all routes and in all important areas. According to the participants of the raid: “There was not a day, almost no hour, without fight. If no shunting fighting with the Red Army, then the petty skirmishes with the detached forces of the Special Forces, Cheka, police “[69]. The Bolshevik leadership sent the two-thousand strong unit of H.Kotovskiy against Volyn Division. Desperate to join the group of Paly’s Podilsk unit and having not managed to find the unit of V.Nelhovskiy, Yu.Tyutyunnyk, eliminating the possibility of further movement deep into Ukraine, decided to turn back to the border. It was impossible to break away from the enemy’s cavalry, but, among other things, also in every village there were the Reds’ departments and they had to needle their way with fighting. According to the recollections of R.Sushko: “The plan, determination, courage, consequent – we had it all, but there were the superior numbers of the stronger enemy, and most importantly – it has already waited for us” [70]. The permanent enemy’s onslaught, continuing fighting without sleep and rest, hunger, extreme cold, lack of roads, fatigue exhausted scantily clad, almost weaponless Ukrainian army. Only fanatical faith in the struggle for freedom helped to sustain those inhuman conditions.

On November, 17, near the village of Malі Mіnki near the town of Bazar the group was surrounded. In a fierce battle, which became the last battle of the Rebel Army, over 400 soldiers were killed, over 500 were taken prisoner, 359 of which the Bolsheviks shot. Only of the headquarters group with a part of wounded a total of 100 people managed to break away from persecution and to cross the border on November 20, 1921.

Therefore, the campaign ended tragically and did not brought the expected results. The intention to stir up the nationhood Ukrainian armed rebellion in order to overthrow the occupation regime in Ukraine ended in failure.

Up to now, some of the reasons for the defeat of the raid are still not entirely clear. Thus, it is an open question on what ground, and who to blame for the beginning of the raid being constantly postponed. The main culprits were mostly Poles considered, and only occasionally the note of the private position of Yu.Tyutyunnyk was taken. Uncertain position of the Polish government, in our opinion, was due to rather sharp struggle between different political forces in Poland.

The contradictory situation was created concerning the problem of who is to blame for the fact that the Ukrainian army did not receive the promised provision of material needs. On the one hand, many facts indicate, that certain Polish circles had taken a provocative position. On the other hand, there is a reason to believe, that the Insurgent Army had not received weapons and clothing due to the intrigues in the top leadership of the UNR.

Anyway, the leaders, both Yu.Tyutyunnik and Petlyura, backed the wrong horse. They believed that the raid would raise morale in the camps and among the rebels. But it led to the collapse of the last hopes, the almost complete demoralization of the rebel movement. Already in November of 1921 the raid was seen as the last tragic chord of insurgency. It had accomplished the destruction of the rebel forces, and discredited the very idea of marching from abroad the remains of Ukrainian Army.

On the other hand, the November Raid had a broad resonance in political and social circles of the West. There was a series of analytical publications, where attention was drawn to the national character and importance of the insurgency. However, after the defeat of the raid the thought of insurgency as a destabilizing factor [71] began to dominate.

After the November Raid, the Bolsheviks began to watch closely what was happening abroad, especially in places where a large number of Ukrainian immigrants lived. Therefore, in the archives there are numerous documents which recorded the Bolshevik foreign agents information. In January 1922, when Finnish troops attacked the territory of Karelia, and the remnants of Kolchak’s army acted in the Far East, the Bolsheviks were waiting for Petliura and White Guard organizations’ attack from Poland and Romania. At this time, the Soviet secret reports were filled with information on the concentration of Petliura, Denikin and Wrangel troops on the border with Soviet Ukraine.

In January, the informants reported on the presence in the area of Lviv-Ternopil a unit of 1500 fighters under the command of Yu.Tyutyunnik, who allegedly planned to move in the direction of Proskuriv. At the same time, in the region of Bendery were concentrated the units of Gulenko-Guliyev with the total number of alleged 10 000 fighters with artillery. The Bolsheviks expected, that Petliurists would cross the border at the same sites as in October – November of 1921 (Gusyatin, Proskuriv, Tyraspol) [72].

According to the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, at the time in Petlyura’s circles there was a dominating point of view, that Yu.Tyutyunnyk’s performance was not regular by nature and could only strengthen the rebel groups in some areas and hold them there until spring, when it was planned to start the regular attack against the territory of Ukraine. While preparing for that uprising, which was to begin in February or March, Petlyura’s agents signed contracts with German companies for supplies of the UNR troops with uniforms and equipment. In the formation of a plan of the uprising the Polish and French officers took part as well. At the beginning of the uprising the partisan divisions had to be split into small groups and pull the forces of the Red Army to places where the regular units of the UNR would not appear. The clandestine agents had to conduct propaganda among the Red Army fighters. The orchestrators hoped for the assistance of the Polish and Romanian troops. The defector, who had escaped from an internment camp in December of 1921, notified the active preparation for the performance, the plan of which was hidden even from the officers. Great hopes were pinned on the cavalry. [73]

It is difficult to say, how all of the reports corresponded to the facts. But some of them are confirmed in the autobiography of Yu.Tyutyunnyk, who pointed out that in the spring of 1922 in Petliura’s circles appeared the new draft of the Polish-Ukrainian campaign, during which Petliura expected to act at the head of the internment units. The possibility of indefinite occupation of Right-Bank Ukraine by the Poles was discussed. In this direction, the appropriate outreach activities among expatriates and secret negotiations with the Piłsudski’s troops [74] were conducted.
One way or another, but certainly two phenomena are reflected in the mentioned facts. First, the November Campaign, despite the defeat, had given the Bolsheviks the creeps. Therefore, their agents, who had missed the beginning of the campaign, now carefully looked narrowly to all suspicious, waiting for the danger where, most likely, it was not. Secondly, the Petliurist command and Yu.Tyutyunnik himself still did not abandon the hope to organize a new campaign and uprisings in Ukraine and made certain steps in that direction. So, after the raid, Yu.Tyutyunnik had proposed the reorganization plan of the Guerrilla-Rebel Headquarters, according to which all the guerrilla-rebel organizations and foreign armed groups, gathered into a joint army would have to unite under his leadership. Yu.Tyutyunnik wanted to put the Guerrilla-Rebel Headquarters to Romania. [75]

Obviously influenced by the death of Yu.Otmarshteyn, Yu.Tyutyunnyk had finally severed his relations with the Poles and Petliura, but did not leave insurgent activity. From now on, he sought to create two independent Ukrainian insurgent organizations, one had to fight against the Poles in Galicia and the other – against the Bolsheviks. It was Y.Dobrotvorsky, who was directly involved in Galicia affairs, he had several dozen assistants at command and apparently cooperated with the Ukrainian Military Organization. In 1922, they set on fire several Polish estates, destroyed communications, performed political terror during the elections to the Sejm.

The rise of insurgent activity in Galicia was accompanied by its decline in the territory of the Ukrainian SSR. The rebel cells created in 1921 were almost completely liquidated. There was far less new organizations and only some of them kept in touch with Yu.Tyutyunnyk, because among the rebels sprang rumors that he had long been enmeshed in webs of the KGB conspiracy. Yu.Tyutyunnyk considered impractical to send his men across the border, because he wanted to use them for fight in Poland. Obviously, that is why it was so easy for him to believe in the information about the All-Ukrainian Military Council, which, according to his plan, was to be the center of the rebel fighting in Soviet Ukraine [76]

After Yu. Tyutyunnyk ceased to have contact with the Polish General Staff, the latter had made several attempts not to let him out of its influence. Z.Florek even offered Yu.Tyutyunnyk to lead insurgent cause independently, without Petliura. In autumn of 1922, Yu.Tyutyunnyk was visited in Lviv by the Colonel of the French Mission, who discussed with him the plan of creating a single anti-Bolshevik front. With the same purpose, and about the time, he was visited by representative of the Russian monarchists (Kirill Vladimirovich group) Prince Khovanskii (pseudonym Lesnobrodsky) and the French Consul from Chernivtsi [77].

At the same time, the Poles wanted to use the Guerrilla-Rebel Headquarters staff to continue the insurgent cause in Soviet Ukraine. At first, they tried in vain to convert the Press Information Bureau in Lviv employees, then they reduced its structure to three people, and later eliminated it at all. Polish officer Sholin (Dobrovolsky) tried to use the leftovers of the Guerrilla-Rebel Headquarters apparatus. He began his activity on behalf of Yu. Tyutyunnyk and using IV ekspozitura in Kraków. But in June 1922, Yu. Tyutyunnyk learned about the activities of Dobrovolsky and forbade his people to cooperate with him. Continued its rebel activities the V ekspozitura in Lviv, which did not formed the rebel centers, but supported the Ukrainian organizations and guerrilla chieftains, in particular Orel-Galchevsky [78], by cash grants.

Yu.Tyutyunnyk spent a part of his time in literary activity. Under the pseudo H.Yurtyk he wrote his memoirs for the “Zagrava” magazine [79], and under his own name he wrote the book “Winter Campaign of 1919-1920.” [80].

Manuscript of the Yu.Tyutyunnyk’s book “Winter Campaign of 1919 – 1920”

(RSA SZRU. – F.11012. – V.42. – P.52 )

In mid-summer of 1922, the authorized representatives of the UNR government and the Staff of Army, among whom was Colonel Boyko, came to Kholodny Yar. At the meeting Boyko said, that the UNR government was not supported by Poland or other countries. Therefore, he called on the rebels to cease their activity, to self-destruct and to go to social activities. Those who wanted, could move to Poland, Romania, even to the West, where they would get help from the government of the UNR [81].

It is possible, that Boyko addressed the meeting by order of the Cheka, not of the Ukrainian government. This opinion was expressed in the memoirs of Otaman Gonta-Lyutyi, pointing out, by the way, that none of the rebels knew those Commissioners, they had only personal identities. After the meeting, Gonta-Lyutyi decided to stay in Zvenigorodschyna. Otaman Chornota (Derkach) stayed in Kholodnyi Yar. Khmara disbanded with Zavgorodniy, gathered around him those who had decided to self-destruct, issued them certificates, money and sent the guys dressed in civilian, to Kherson, Mykolayiv, Kharkiv and other cities, which already had his people.

Zavgorodniy had gathered Cossacks and moved to the border. But at the time the border strip was well-guarded. The rebels came to the Bug, crossed it and went to the left of Vapnyarka. At that time, they learned, that if the whole group crossed the border, the Poles would intern it. To avoid this, the guerrillas began to move in small groups of 5-10 people. Several of those groups had crossed the border, but the Reds began to surround the team, there were fights with heavy losses. It was decided to come back [82].

While having returned, Zavgorodniy continued to operate until September 1922, when he was arrested along with many other otamans of Kholodny Yar at the “rebel” Congress in Zvenygorodka which had been organized by the Chekists. Zavgorodniy’s arrest was the result of a large-scale affair of Cheka. Having realized, that it was extremely hard to wipe out the rebels, who did not believe the amnesty, in open battle, the Bolsheviks decided to fight with them by creating fictitious rebel organizations to identify and destroy the active or potential enemies of the Soviet power.
To implement that plan was established the “Black Sea Rebel Group”, which sought to unite all the rebel groups and cells of Odesa, Mykolayiv, Katerynoslav and Kremenchuk provinces. The “Group” was headed by a traitor – former colonel of the UNR Army General Staff Trofymenko, alias Hamaliya. Sotnyk Zaviryukha, who was a chekist, became the chief of Staff. The Headquarters had issued a series of orders. According to the order № 10 dated September 30, it was appointed the Rebel Congress for planning the further struggle (whether to start an uprising in the places of their activity, or to focus on the border area). The venue of the Congress was scheduled in Zvenyhorodka. It was prescribed to all commanders of divisions, regiments, all the heads of rebel committees to attend it [83].

Provocateurs infiltrated the Ataman Zavgorodniy’s environment through forester Silvestrov, who helped the rebels for a long time. The son of a forester was a cadet of Zinoviev Cavalry School (Yelisavetgrad) and the Cheka informer. Having learned from his father about the rebels, Silvestrov Jr. with the help of his friend and by order and plan of the Cheka began to act. Through his father he handed Zavgorodniy a letter in which he reported that, allegedly, in a cavalry school there was a group of indigenous resistance fighters, who were looking for a meetings with the rebels. Zavgorodniy took it in and wanted to meet with cadets. During the meeting, they make arrangements for a meeting in Zvenygorodka, where, ostensibly for a couple of weeks, the whole neighborhood had to come, namely Otaman Gonta, the representatives of the Government, even Yu.Tyutyunnyk.

Apart from Zavgorodniy, the meeting was attended by such famous leaders as Gupalo, Golyk-Zaliznyak, Kompaniets, Dobrovolskiy, Tkachenko. The group of GPU staff and chekists who played the role of “the congress participants”, without firing a shot disarmed and captured alive all the chieftains. At the same time, on the matter at hand in Kyiv, Odesa and Elisavetgrad were arrested Zdobud-Volya, Lyashenko, Yakovenko Drobotkivsky, Musket and others. Chieftains had rebelled in prison and died in battle. [84]

Despite that, the rebel movement in Mykolayivschyna was running on. The main core of the rebel movement was the squad of Otaman Svysch, which had 110 sabers. It was a remnant of the Ivanov’s detachment. In May, after fighting with the Bolsheviks, Svysch’s squad split into several groups of 7-8 people, which made small attacks. Svysch acted in the south-east of the New Bug and called himself Black Raven [85].

Most of guerillas at the end of 1922 were well aware, that continued insurgent struggle could not lead to successful general uprising. But it continued in order to “manifest liberty before the world, and for future generations to put on a cycle of the history a clear pointer which will point them the way to the big goal … must be preserved a glorious tradition of heroic armed struggle for their rights -this is a foundation of indestructibility of our nation … because it was the issue not of one generation fate at the given moment, but of the final link, which should combine a glorious past with a future; of a decent political and moral position of the Ukrainian people in the aspect of the past, the present and the future “[86].

At the end of 1923, the insurgency began to fade. Despite the fact that next spring there was some next recovery, and some units continued to act up to the collectivization, the general character of the liberation struggle had changed. Most of the guerrillas either went abroad, or “dissolved” in the mass of civilians. Rebel committees almost ceased their activity. Those inconsiderable in number groups which continued to operate, did not not cherish hopes for a general uprising, did not wait for assistance from the UNR Army, did not have any central leadership and relationships between them, they performed without any plan, on their own. Their activities were mainly criminal and terrorist. Some of the rebels, in view of the liberalization of Bolshevik’s policy, moved away from the fighting for a time, and some continued it with new methods, particularly in the field of cultural work. A framework of the future of the national liberation movement had been establishing.

The elimination of the main rebel chieftain – Yu.Tyutyunnyk still remains a mystery. Does not shed full light on this event the Yu.Tyutyunnyk’s autobiography, from which obviously the relevant pages were removed. The literature about the rebel movement speaks of several versions of voluntary or involuntary adhering of the General to the Bolsheviks in 1923
According to official Soviet version, Yu.Tyutyunnyk crossed the border in mid-1923 for underground work in the new Petliurist organization – “Supreme Military Council”. Even being abroad, he realized that the Ukrainian emigration was used by dominant forces in the West for their own benefit, but not for the liberation of the Ukrainian people. Having seen the state of the rebel movement, Yu.Tyutyunnyk along with the part of the Guerrilla-Rebel Headquarters staff appeared before the Soviet authorities and surrendered. GPU has given approval for amnesty. In early November, Yu.Tyutyunnyk’s appeal to all Ukrainian military immigrants appeared in the press. On December,28, 1923, the Presidium of the All-Ukrainian Central Executive Committee granted the amnesty petition of Yu.Tyutyunnyk [87].

The second version is Yu.Tyutyunnyk’s betrayal. Since the voluntary and involuntary adhering of Yu.Tyutyunnyk to the Bolsheviks, he was time and again accused of treason both by former friends and enemies. Actually, Galician trudoviks accused Yu.Tyutyunnyk of having links with O.Shumsky and A.Savytsky, and in 1922 he allegedly negotiated with V.Balytsky, gave him an archive and sent his family in hostage [88].

According to the third version, Yu.Tyutyunnyk’s “return” was the elaborated Cheka operation similar to B.Savinkov’s “return” in 1924. O. Kobets in his memoirs described the conversation with the former rebel, sotnyk Zayarniy, who confessed O.Kobets that, after his arrest in danger of death, betrayed and was given the task to persuade Yu.Tyutyunnyk to return to Ukraine. For this Zayarniy was “broken out“. He got a bunch of letters written by Yu.Tyutyunnyk’s own closest friends, colleagues and his staff folks. In addition, he had to convince the General that in Ukraine the uprising was about to explode. So to say, it was only him who was waiting for. First Yu.Tyutyunnyk looked askance at Zayarniy. The second time, when the traitor had brought Yu.Tyutyunnyk a letter from his wife, he agreed to go to Ukraine. At the border he was arrested by the Cheka. Under threat of death the General was demanded to write a letter of rejection, but he refused and agreed only when they began to threaten, that they would execute his wife and daughter [89].

This version is confirmed and complemented by the memories of Soviet diplomat H.Besedovsky who reported, that GPU had developed a special plan to eliminate Yu.Tyutyunnyk. Chekists got on the track of an underground organization – the Supreme Military Council. But instead of elimination, the GPU had infiltrated into it its agents, who actually took control over the organization. Then they sent one of the leaders of this organization, a personal friend of Yu.Tyutyunnyk (perhaps it was already mentioned Zayarny) with instructions to call him to Ukraine for monitoring of the organization. Yu.Tyutyunnyk first sent one of his assistants. He had examined the “organization” and, after returning, said that it “can be fully trusted.” The leaders waited for Yu.Tyutyunnyk’s personal visit to get direct guidance. At first Yu.Tyutyunnyk hesitated, but then agreed, crossed the border at the point in hiding, where he was arrested. In our opinion, of the three versions the most plausible one is that it was the Cheka operation. That version is the most logical and reasonable and, most importantly, consistent with fragmentary information from Yu.Tyutyunnyk’s autobiography, stating that his position was influenced by the decision of the XXII Russian communist party of the Bolsheviks Congress on the issue of inter-ethnic relations [90].

Yu.Tyutyunnyk was brought to Kyiv, and then to Kharkiv. The battle between Kharkiv and Moscow for his fate began. F.Dzerzhynskiy sought his death, but Kharkiv showed that Yu.Tyutyunnyk could still be useful. The Otaman was left to live in Kharkiv under the supervision of the GPU. Under duress, he wrote a letter of repentance to V. Zatonskiy, postcard-appeal “To all Ukrainian soldiers in exile” and a letter to the “Delo” newspaper [91].

Soon Yu.Tyutyunnyk passed his own archive and brought his family from abroad. Only then the GPU of the Ukrainian SSR allowed the General to apply amnesty. On the 28th of December, 1923, Presidium of the Central Executive Committee of the Ukrainian SSR approved clemency application of Yu.Tyutyunnyk, but left restriction on rights for him for 1 year [92].

Since 1924, Yu.Tyutyunnyk tried to live by the laws of Soviet Ukraine. He published a controversial essay “Poles against Ukraine”, taught at the Kharkiv Red Officers School. And then he was attracted by the cinema. He worked at Ukrainian Photo and Cinema Administration (VUFKU). He played himself in the artistic-documentary “PKP”. Together with M.Yohanes and O.Dovzhenko wrote the screenplay for the film “Zvenyhora”, which was released in 1928 [93]. The shooting of the film took place in Odesa, where Yu.Tyutyunnyk was the commandant and it was there he met a young talented Ukrainian writer Yu.Yanovskiy, the fact which should be classified as indirect influence of Yu.Tyutyunnyk on highlighting the history of Mykolaivschyna.

While working as the chief editor of the Odesa film studio, Yu.Yanovskiy met and became friends with the legendary military leader of the Ukrainian guerilla movement Yu.Tyutyunnyk. It was he who told many interesting things to the writer on the heroic era with vivid details, which were used in the future work of the writer. The heroism of South steppe affected Yu.Yanovskyi and resulted in the writing of novels “Riders,” “Four swords” (banned by the censor at the time) and the revolutionary drama “Ballad of Brytanka”.

The basis of the novel “The four swords” was the facts related to the peasant rebel movement in Southern Ukraine. The novel was sharply condemned by the orthodox vulgar socialist critics as nationalist, false and defamatory concerning triumphant Red Army activity led by the Communists. The author was criticized for chanting anarchy and otamanship. For those serious “flaws” the “Four swords” were permanently removed from Ukrainian literature, the first editions of it were hidden to the special fund. The Artist was forced to make excuses for translations of the novel in Czech and German, for its appearance abroad, and soon to condemn the novel publicly as his mistake. Probably, it was necessary to have a lot of courage in his heart to withstand all charges for this truly sincere, honest and faithful novel, to forcibly change his ideological and artistic landmarks, actually to deny himself. “Four swords” was the last opus, where Yu.Yanovskyy remained his own. [94].

In an effort to perpetuate the liberation movement of his people, Yu.Yanovskyy embodied it primarily in the heroes of “Four swords.” “I devote it to guerillas of Ukraine” – these words stand at the autograph of the work, but were not included in any of his publications. However, they were continued in the the “Riders” and “Ballad of Brytanka”. It is “Ballad of Brytanka” where he highlighted the heroic events of the history of Ukrainian rebel movement which took place in Vysunsk and Poltavka-Bashtanka in Mykolayivschyna [95].

It was the last thing Lieutenant-General Yu.Tyutyunnyk could do for Mykolayivschyna. On February 12, 1929 he was arrested by the GPU in Kharkiv. The same day the head of the 3rd department KRO GPU Tolstov issued a search and arrest warrant №49 for seizure of Yu.Tyutyunnyk. It stated that accused Yu.Tyutyunnyk was charged with anti-revolutionary activity [96].
Search and arrest of Yu.Tyutyunnyk warrant

(RSA SZRU. – F.6. Case №73862-AG. – P.3)

On Yu.Tyutyunnyk has been built a case №71021 dated February 12, 1929, in which he had been charged under Article 58-10 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR, as a person who was engaged in counter-revolutionary activities. The Commission concluded: “… Tyutyunyk after his forced move to the Soviet side, declaring his loyalty to the Soviet power, kept silence on the establishment by the Guerrilla-Rebel Headquarters a subversive insurgent network, which was known to the Poles and now is partially used, showing once again its activity…

In his testimony Tyutyunnyk outlined his position of Ukrainian fascist, saying the Soviet power, contributing by it’s social policy to the development of national consciousness and to the growth of the national forces, more than any whatsoever other form of state power, gradually became outdated, and, of course, the time would come when it should be replaced by other forms of state structure. The objective of Ukrainian national forces at the present time should be every kind of assistance to the growth of the cultural and economic level of the Ukrainian population in the social policy of the Soviet government ,and thus accelerating the process of growth of the national consciousness and of the national forces.

The future of an independent Ukrainian state has to be bourgeois, and, of course, with the national dictatorship. The leading role in it should belong to the peasants …
Consequently, the investigation confirms the GPU information concerning Tyutyunnyk ‘s hostile activities”

Photo of Yu.Tyutyunnyk arrested. 03/08/1929

(RSA SZRU. – F.6. – Case №73862-AG.)

On December 3rd, 1929, the Board of the OGPU deliverd a judgement: “Tyutyunnik Yuri Yosyfovich – to be shot down. Execution of sentence will be suspended until further notice” [98]. On October 20, 1930, the sentence was enforced [99].

Yu.Tyutyunnyk was rehabilitated on November 27, 1997. In the information approved by the Deputy Prosecutor General of Ukraine B.Ferents, it is reported that it was possible “… in the absence of aggregate evidence basis, supporting the validity of the attraction to the responsibility” [100].

It was the fate of the prominent figure of the Ukrainian national liberation movement Cornet-General Ataman Yuri Osypovych Tyutyunnyk, who had a significant impact on Mykolayivschyna and Ukraine-wide.

List of References:

  1. Шатайло О.Л. Генерал Юрко Тютюнник. – Львів: Світ, 2000. – С.6.
  2. Тинченко Я. Українське офіцерство: шляхи скорботи та забуття 1917-1921 рр. – Ч.1. – К.: Тиражувальний центр УРП, 1995. – С.127.
  3. Лисенко А. На чолі повстанських мас: отаман Никифор Григор’єв // З архівів ВУЧК – ГПУ – НКВД – КГБ. – 1999. – № 1/2. – С.63.
  4. Галузевий державний архів Служби зовнішньої розвідки України (далі – ГДА СЗР України). – Ф.11012. – Т.17. – Арк.17-18.
  5. Антонов-Овсієнко. В боротьбі за Радянську Україну // Літопис революції. – 1931 – № 3. – С.85.
  6. Галузевий державний архів Служби безпеки України (далі – ГДА СБ України) – Спр.476. – Арк.23.
  7. Тинченко Я. Українське офіцерство: шляхи скорботи та забуття. – С.188.
  8. Шатайло О.Л. Генерал Юрко Тютюнник. – С.22.
  9. Горак В. Повстанці отамана Григор’єва. – С.59-62.
  10. Путь социал-демократа (Николаев). – 1919. – 14 марта.
  11. Рубач М. К истории гражданской войны на Украине // Летопись революции. – 1924. – № 3. – С.186.
  12. Николаевщина в годы иностранной военной интервенции и гражданской войны (март 1918-декабрь 1920). Документы и материалы. – Херсон: Книжно-газетное изд., 1962. – С.103.
  13. Горак В. Повстанці отамана Григор’єва (серпень 1918 – серпень 1919 рр.). – Фастів: Поліфаст, 1998. – С.66.
  14. Путь социал-демократа (Николаев). – 1919. – 5 марта.
  15. Горак В. Повстанці отамана Григор’єва (серпень 1918 – серпень 1919 рр.) – С.67.
  16. Лисенко А. На чолі повстанських мас: отаман Никифор Григор’єв. – С.70.
  17. Горак В. Повстанці отамана Григор’єва (серпень 1918 – серпень 1919 рр.) – С.69.
  18. Горак В. Ватаг Таврійського степу // Час. – 1997. – 29 травня – 4 червня.
  19. Горак В. Повстанці отамана Григор’єва (серпень 1918 – серпень 1919 рр.) – С.71-72.
  20. Центральний державний архів громадських організацій України. – Ф.57. – Оп.2. – Спр.342. – Арк.56.
  21. Шатайло О.Л. Генерал Юрко Тютюнник. – С.23.
  22. Центральний державний архів вищих органів влади та управління України (далі – ЦДАВО України). – Ф.1076. – Оп.3. – Спр.11. – Арк.3.
  23. Зимові походи Армії УНР 1919-20 і 1921. – Режим доступу: http://pravopys.vlada.kiev.ua/mova/20/Dovidn/Zymovi_pokhody_armii_UNR.htm
  24. Литвин С. Симон Петлюра у 1917-1926 роках: Історіографія та джерела / НАН України; Інститут української археографії та джерелознавства ім. М.С.Грушевського; Севастопольський військово- морський ін-т ім. П.С.Нахімова.- К.: «Аквілон-Прес», 2000. – С.247.
  25. Доценко О. Зимовий похід (6.ХІІ. 1919 – 6.V.1920). – К.: Видавництво імені Олени Теліги, 2001. – С.18.
  26. Історія України / В. Ф. Верстюк, О. В. Горань, О. І. Гуржій; під ред. В. А. Смолій. – К.: Альтернатива, 1997. – С.228.
  27. Шатайло О.Л. Генерал Юрко Тютюнник. – С.44.
  28. Доценко О. Зимовий похід (6.ХІІ. 1919 – 6.V.1920). – С.22.
  29. Шатайло О.Л. Генерал Юрко Тютюнник. – С.44.
  30. ГДА СЗР України. – Ф.11012. – Т.17. – Арк.193-194.
  31. Там само. – Арк.195.
  32. Там само. – Арк.196, 228.
  33. Доценко О. Зимовий похід (6.ХІІ. 1919 – 6.V.1920). – С.26.
  34. ГДА СЗР України. – Ф.11012. – Т.17. – Арк.234.
  35. Там само. – Арк.184.
  36. Доценко О. Зимовий похід (6.ХІІ. 1919 – 6.V.1920). – С.54.
  37. Тютюнник Ю. Зимовий похід 1919-1920 рр. – 2-е вид. – Нью-Йорк: Видавництво Чарторийських, 1966. – С.60.
  38. Шатайло О.Л. Генерал Юрко Тютюнник. – С.48.
  39. Тютюнник Ю. Зимовий похід 1919-1920 рр. – С.58.
  40. ГДА СЗР України. – Ф.11012. – Т.18. – Арк.290.
  41. Шатайло О.Л. Генерал Юрко Тютюнник. – С.48.
  42. Литвин С. Симон Петлюра у 1917-1927 роках. – С.248.
  43. Доценко О. Зимовий похід (6.ХІІ. 1919 – 6.V.1920). – С.117.
  44. ГДА СЗР України. – Ф.11012. – Т.18. – Арк.478.
  45. Шкварець В.П. Українська національно-демократична революція і боротьба за незалежність на Миколаївщині (1917-1921). – Миколаїв: Видавництво МДГУ імені Петра Могили, 2007. – С.74-75.
  46. ГДА СЗР України. – Ф.11012. – Т.26. – Арк.61, 62.
  47. Там само. – Арк.66.
  48. Там само. – Арк.69.
  49. Там само. – Арк.92.
  50. Там само. – Арк.94.
  51. Тютюнник Ю. Зимовий похід 1919-1920 рр. – С.69.
  52. ГДА СЗР України. – Ф.11012. – Т.42. – Арк.266.
  53. Доценко О. Зимовий похід (6.ХІІ. 1919 – 6.V.1920). – С.20.
  54. Ейдеман Р., Какурін Н. Громадянська війна на Україні. – X.: Державне видавництво України, 1928. – С.51.
  55. Тютюнник Ю. Зимовий похід 1919-1920 рр. – С.65.
  56. Залізний хрест УНР.
  57. Безансон А. Війна більшовиків проти селян // Всесвіт. – 1993. – № 9-10. – С.129.
  58. Грациози А. Великая крестьянская война в СССР. Большевики и крестьяне. 1917-1933. – М.: РОССПЭН, 2001. – С.5.
  59. Ганжа О.І. Українське село в період становлення тоталітарного режиму (1917-1927 рр.). – К.: НАН України Інститут історії України, 2000. – С.134.
  60. Грациози А. Великая крестьянская война в СССР. Большевики и крестьяне. 1917-1933. – С.31.
  61. Кин Д. Крестьянство и гражданская война // На аграрном фронте. – 1925. – № 11-12. – С.128.
  62. Верстюк В.Ф. Внутренний фронт: стратегия и тактика борьбы // Украина в 1917-1921 гг. Некоторые проблемы истории. – К.: Наукова думка, 1991. – С.132.
  63. Кучер О.О. Розгром збройної внутрішньої контрреволюції на Україні у 1921-1923 рр. – Харків: Видавництво Харківського університету, 1971. – С.9-11.
  64. Боровець-Бульба Т. Армія без держави: Слава і трагедія українського повстанського руху: Спогади // Дніпро. – 1996. – № 7/8. – С.20-23.
  65. Улянич В. Жили-були батьки отамани, або чому треба вивчати повстанський рух в Україні (1917-1923 рр.) // Голос України. – 1994. – 26 березня.
  66. Пріцак О. Історіософія Михайла Грушевського // Грушевський М.С. Історія України-Руси. В 11 т., 12 кн. – К.: Наукова думка, 1991. – Т.1. – С.LXV-LXIX.
  67. Другий зимовий похід.
  68. Литвин С. Другий Зимовий похід Армії Української Народної Республіки // Воєнна історія – 2002. – №5-6.
  69. Шпілінський О. Базар (1921 р. – 1931 р.) // За державність. – № 3. – С.127.
  70. Сушко Р. Базар: могила 359 героїв // Календар Червоної Калини. – Львів, 1930. – С.27.
  71. Шинкаренко Т.І. Український національно-визвольний рух в 1920-1923 рр. в контексті зовнішньої політики західних держав: Автореф. дис. канд. іст. наук: 07.00.02 / Київський університет ім. Тараса Шевченка. – К., 1999. – С.17.
  72. ЦДАВО України. – Ф.2297. – Оп.2. – Спр.11. – Арк.21-22.
  73. Там само. – Арк.68.
  74. Божко О. Генерал-хорунжий Армії УНР. Невідома автобіографія Ю.Тютюнника // З архівів ВУЧК-ГПК-НКВД-КГБ. – 1998. – № 1-2. – С.49-50.
  75. Сідак В. Партизансько-Повстанський Штаб Державного центру УНР в еміграції (1921 р.): Нарис. – К.: Інститут підготовки кадрів СБУ, Інститут історії НАН України, 1995. – С.11.
  76. Божко О. Генерал-хорунжий Армії УНР. Невідома автобіографія Ю.Тютюнника – С.53-54.
  77. Тютюнник Ю. З поляками проти Вкраїни / Передм. і примітки М.Любченка. – Харків: Державне видавництво України, 1924. – С.95.
  78. Божко О. Генерал-хорунжий Армії УНР. Невідома автобіографія Ю.Тютюнника – С.53.
  79. Тютюнник Ю. Революційна стихія // Дзвін. – 1991. – № 7. – С.84-95. – № 8. – С.92-107.
  80. ГДА СЗР України. – Ф.11012. – Т.42. – Арк.52-175.
  81. Дорошенко М. «Стежками Холодноярськими». Спогади: 1918-1923. – Філадельфія, 1973. – С.196-198.
  82. Героїзм і трагедія Холодного Яру. Збірник матеріалів і спогадів. – К.: Незборима нація, 1996. – С.223-224, 228-229.
  83. Героїзм і трагедія Холодного Яру. – С.232.
  84. Горліс-Горський Ю. Холодний Яр: У 2-х ч. – Лондон: Видання Мироненко, 1967 – С.334-335.
  85. ЦДАВО України. – Ф.1. – Оп.2. – Спр.6. – Арк.63.
  86. Мірчук П. Українська Повстанська Армія. 1942-1952. Документи і матеріали. – Мюнхен, 1953. – С.9-10.
  87. Голинков Д.Л. Крушение антисоветского подполья в СССР (1917-1925 гг.). В 2-х кн. – М.: Политиздат, 1986. – Кн.2. – С.241-242.
  88. Царинный А. Украинское движение. Краткий исторический очерк, преимущественно по личным воспоминаниям // Украинский сепаратизм в России. Идеология национального раскола. Сборник. – М.: Москва, 1998. – С.213, 244.
  89. Кентій А.В. Українська Військова Організація (УВО) в 1921-1928 рр.: Короткий нарис. – К.: Інститут історії України НАН України, 1998. – 80 с.
  90. Божко О. Генерал-хорунжий Армії УНР. Невідома автобіографія Ю.Тютюнника – С.54.
  91. Шатайло О.Л. Генерал Юрко Тютюнник. – С.102-103.
  92. Там само. – С.103.
  93. Звенигора (фильм).
  94. Юрій Яновський «І світ розчинено як двері». – Режим доступу: http://www.ukrlit.vn.ua/article/346.html
  95. Котляр Ю.В. Висунська і Баштанська республіки. – Миколаїв: Видавництво ЧДУ імені Петра Могили, 2009. – С.112.
  96. ГДА СБ України – Ф.6. – Спр.73862-ФП. – Арк.3-4.
  97. Там само. – Арк.42-43
  98. Там само. – Арк.46.
  99. Там само. – Арк.65.
  100. 100.Шатайло О.Л. Генерал Юрко Тютюнник. – С.126.


(Котляр Ю.В., Білоконь І.В. Ю.Тютюнник в українському повстанському русі та Миколаївщина // Реабілітовані історією. Миколаївська область. – Кн.5. – Київ – Миколаїв: Світогляд, 2010. – С. 7-32)

What's more interesting

SZRU Is Expanding Its Interaction with NATO Member States' Intelligence Community
1 030
Foreign Intelligence of Ukraine: From Bohdan Khmelnytskyi's Scouts to Euro-Atlantic Integration
1 003
A Presentation of the Documentary about a Ukrainian Intelligence Officer